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I. INTRODUCTION

What if Jerome Siegel had known that a substantial amount of his estate
would be depleted with the inclusion of his heirs' future interest in the
Superman copyright because the right affords no ability to pay the tax?1 Would
he have sold'Superman to DC Comics in 1938-a transaction that led to the
proliferation and mass appeal of the Superman character 2-- or would he have
retained the copyright, or not even pursued the creation of Superman in the
first place? The adage "what you don't know, can't hurt you" is operative here
because the transaction took place before the implementation of the Copyright
Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act), 3 which statutorily creates termination rights for
authors and,. their heirs upon the disposition of a copyright. 4 However, the
author of the next Superman may be more hesitant to sell her copyright, and on
the margin the adverse estate tax consequences could incentivize hoarding the
Alternatively, authors and their heirs may devise settlement
copyright.5
agreements like those in Larson v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., which effectively
circumvent the policy goal behind the 1976 Act to protect authors and their
6
heirs.
Part II of this Note explains how copyright termination rights are created
and the effects of those rights on both authors and their heirs. Part II also
describes the statutory framework governing the inheritance of termination
7
rights and the mechanics of heirs' voting powers under the 1976 Act. It
further discusses the basic estate tax assessment rules and the imputation of a

1 See Larson v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., No. 2:04-cv-08776-ODW (RZx), 2013 WL 1688199,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2013) (order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment re:
Superboy and the Superman ads), ECF No. 222 (discussing the estate of Jerome Siegel).
2

See

LEE DANIELS, SUPERMAN: THE COMPLETE HISTORY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE MAN

OF STEEL 26-28 (1998) (discussing the evolution and success of the Superman comics).
3 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.

§ 101-810 (1976)). The 1976 Act became effective, and offered protection to only those works
entering the public domain before January 1, 1978. Id. §§ 90 Stat. at 2591-93; 17 U.S.C. 5 203
(2013).
4 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (2012).
5 Bridget J. Crawford & Mitchell M. Gans, Sticky Copyrights: Discriminatogy Tax Restraints on the
Transfer of Intellectual Propery, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 74 (2010) ("Enforcement of the wealth
transfer tax system would lead to an inefficient hoarding of intellectual property, as creative
individuals would seek to minimize their tax exposure.").
6 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740 ("The
provisions of [17 U.S.C. §] 203 are ... based on the premise... [of] safeguarding authors against
unremunerative transfers... [and] are needed because of the unequal bargaining position of
authors... [due to] the impossibility of determining a word's value until it has been exploited.").
7 17 U.S.C. § 203.
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"stepped-up basis." 8 Finally, Part II will examine how this stepped-up basis
affects the income tax consequences of heirs who, after exercising termination
rights, reassign a copyright. 9
Part III first considers the income tax implications of the Internal Revenue
Service's failure to assess an estate tax upon the inheritance of termination
rights.10 This section discusses the problems of liquidity, ability to pay,
valuation, and fairness inherent in any potential assessment of an estate tax. It
then poses an alternative approach to govern where (1) no estate tax is assessed,
(2) no stepped-up basis is created, and (3) the heirs are instead treated as if they
took the place of the author for income tax purposes on the reassignment of a
recaptured copyright. This alternative approach avoids the tax enforcement
problems inherent in the current system, mitigates distortions in the behavior of
taxpayers, and ensures that tax consequences optimally approximate economic
realities.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INALIENABLE TERMINATION RIGHTS FOR AUTHORS AND HEIRS

When an author produces a creative work, she becomes entitled to a
copyright in relation to that work." However, this is not the case when an
author produces a creative work while being employed to do so. 12 Although an
13
author is not required to register a creative work for the copyright to vest,
registration is a prerequisite to an award of statutory damages in infringement
suits. 1 4 Once produced, a work is protected for the author's life plus seventy
years.' 5 Although an author has the exclusive right to freely transfer a copyright
or interests therein subject to the life of the copyright, 16 termination rights
significantly limit the rights an assignee acquires in a copyright.'"

8 26 U.S.C. §§ 1014, 2031 (2012).

9Id. § 61(a)(3), (6).

10 See Crawford & Gans, supra note 5, at 74 ("To date, the Service has not sought to enforce
any... tax consequences of [termination rights].").
11 17 U.S.C. § 201 (a).
12 Id. 201(b).
13Id. §408(a).
14 Id.

412.

15 Id. §302(a).
16 Id.§ 201(d).
17 Id.§§

203, 304(c).
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The Copyright Act of 1976 went into effect on January 1, 1978.18 The rules
governing copyright termination rights, as promulgated in the 1976 Act, are
codified in § 203 and 304(c)) 9 The purpose underlying termination rights is to
protect authors of creative works and their heirs when the value of the creative
work is unknowable or when the buyer of the copyright, usually an institution,
has substanti y greater bargaining power in the original transaction. 20 Section
203 effectuates this purpose by allowing authors or their heirs to "terminate"
the agreement that originally transferred the copyright. 21 Furthermore, even if
an author purportedly transfers his rights to a creative work for "the remaining
life of the copyright," § 203 renders such clauses void beginning thirty-five
years after the transfer, once the author or his heirs have exercised the
termination right.22 Additionally, the 1976 Act does not give any legal effect to
transfers by authors or heirs purporting to dispose of termination rights; that is,
23
termination rights are inalienable.
By providing that a termination right may be exercised thirty-five years after
the initial transfer of a copyright, 24 the 1976 Act ensures that the copyright is
more accurately valued based on its performance in the market during that
thirty-five year period.25 Accordingly, this symmetry of information places
authors and heirs on relatively more equal footing with institutional -buyers
when they seek to terminate the pre-existing copyright agreement, and
subsequently reassign the copyright.2 6 In order to recapture the copyright, the
author's heirs must first elect to do so under the voting rules provided in 5 203.
18 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2592.
19 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(e). Section 304(a) applies to copyrights in "the first or renewal term
on January 1, 1978" that are subject to "a transfer or license.., executed before January 1, 1978."
Id. § 304(c). Section 203 applies solely to transfers executed "on or after January 1, 1978." Id.
§ 203(a).
20 See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Poob-Poohing Copyight Law's '1nalienable" Termination
Rights, 57 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 799, 802 (2010) ("Congress has sought to protect authors
and their families by allowing them to grant their copyrights for exploitation and then, decades
later, recapture those same rights.").
21 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)-(2).
22 Id. § 203(a)(3), (5) ("Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant."
(emphasis added)).
23 Id. § 203(a)(5); see also Menell & Nimmer, supra note 20, at 807 (construing identical language
in § 304(c)(5) as congressional intent to render this "scheme inalienable").
24 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3).
25 See Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, Inc., 981 F.2d 679, 683 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[U]nlike
real property and other forms of personal property, [a copyright] is by its very nature incapable of
accurate monetary evaluation prior to its exploitation." (alterations in original) (quoting 2
MELVILLE B. NIMNER & DAVID N'TiER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 (1989))).

26 See Milne ex re. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Ci. 2005) ("The
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B. EXERCISE OF TERMINATION RIGHTS BY HEIRS

an author dies before the "termination window" ends, 27 § 203
determines how the interests in a termination right are divided' among the
author's surviving heirs. 28 This division operates without regard to other federal
or, state inheritance laws and nullifies any testamentary dispositions of
termination rights by the author.29 Likewise, the same result would follow if a
statutory heir attempted to dispose of his or her termination right via
30
testation.
Section 203 provides that if only a spouse survives an author, the spouse
31
becomes entitled to the entire interest in the author's termination right.
However, if children also survive the author, the spouse receives a one-half
interest and the remaining one-half interest is divided among the surviving
children. 32 If a child of the author predeceases the author, but that child's
children survive both the parent and the author, those children will be entitled
to their parent's interest on a "per stirpes" 33 basis. 34 Alternatively, if the author
is only survived by his children, or the children of any deceased child, those
remaining heirs will become entitled to the entire interest in the termination
right on a per stirpes basis. 35 Otherwise, if the author is not survived by a
spouse, children, or grandchildren, the entire termination interest passes to "the
36
author's executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee."
In order to terminate an original copyright disposition during the
termination window, a majority of an author's heirs, as defined by their
-When

rationale behind the legislation was to 'safeguard[] authors against unremunerative transfers' and
improve the 'bargaining position of authors' by giving them a second chance to negotiate more
advantageous grants in their works after the works had been sufficiently 'exploited' to determine
their 'value.'" (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740)).
27 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) ("Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period
of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the

grant .... ).
28 Id. § 203(a)(2).

29 See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 20, at 819 ("Notwithstanding... testamentary dispositions,
Congress vested the tight to terminate transfers automatically in the author's statutory
successors ... .
30 Id. at 813-14.
31 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(A).

32 Id. § 203(a)(2)(B).
33 In a "per stirpes" distribution, the interest is [p]roportionately divided between beneficiaries
according to their deceased ancestor's share. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1260 (9th ed. 2009).
34 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(C).
35

Id.

36

Id. § 203(a)(2)(D).
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statutory interest, must elect to exercise the termination right. 37 For example, if
a spouse and three children survive an author, the spouse and at least one child
must elect to exercise the termination right. The spouse acting alone, or the
three children acting in unison, could not exercise the right, since they 'would
only represent one-half of the termination interest.
With an established framework for the rules surrounding the inheritance of a
termination right, this Note next explores the rules governing the tax
consequences of that same event.
C. THE ESTATE TAX ON THE PRESENT VALUE OF TERMINATION RIGHTS

As a general rule, the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) assesses an
estate tax based on the fair market value of a decedent's gross estate at i.he time
of death. 38 The gross estate includes "all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated," 39 including all property in which the decedent
has an interest.40
Because the termination right is a kind of intangible property, it presumably
is includable in the gross estate of the author.41 While no cases specifically state
whether a termination right is one of the intangible property interests
contemplated by § 2031, the law is well-established that, in general, future
interests in property are includable in the gross estate. 42 For example, in Estate
of Raimondi v. Commissioner,43 in which the decedent had remainder interests in
three real properties, the Tax Court held that, under § 2031, those remainder
44
interests were includable in the gross estate for estate tax purposes.
When future property interests are included in the gross estate, the estate
must pay an estate tax thereon based on the asset's present value, which is
calculated by evaluating its fair market value 45 at the date of the decedent's
death. 46 For example, in Estate of Shackleford v. United States,47 where the
37 Id. § 203(a)(1).
38 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (a) (2012); id. § 2031 (a).
39 Id. 2031 (a).

- Id. § 2033.
41 Crawford & Gans, supra note 5, at 52 & n.167.
42 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(a), (d)(2)(ii) (2013) ("[T]he fair market value of... remainders[]
and reversionary interests for estates of decedents is the present value of such interests,
determined... by the appropriate remainder interest actuarial factor [under 28 U.S.C. § 7520].').
43 Estate of Raimondi v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 70 (T.C. 1970).

44Id.
45 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) ("The fair market value is the price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.").
- Id. § 20.2031-7(a), (d)(2)(ii).
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decedent was entitled to non-assignable future annual payments pursuant to his
lottery award, the district court held that the present value of the future lottery
payments should be included in the gross estate, which was to be calculated
based on the fair market value of the stream of payments. 48 The court also
concluded that, even though no actual market could exist for a non-assignable
49
right, it "must assume the existence of a valid hypothetical sale."
An exception to the estate tax assessment is that a certain base amount of
the gross estate is excludable from the estate tax.50 Pursuant to the American
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012,51 that exclusion amount is five million dollars,
adjusted for inflation, with 2011 as the base year.5 2 However, Congress
53
modifies the estate tax exclusion frequently and with substantial magnitude.
For example, in 1978 the exclusion amount was $134,000.54 Thus, while the
current exclusion is currently $5,250,000,55 Congress might reduce it
substantially in the future in response to either tax revenue shortages from
other sources or a general increase in overall governmental spending.5 6 At any
rate, since the relevant period for determining the estate tax liability exclusion
available 'to heirs who are currently recapturing and reassigning copyrights is the
date of the author's death, the exclusion applicable at that time will apply to the
57
inheriance of termination rights.
58
Another key exception to estate tax liability is the marital deduction,
sometimes referred to as the "unlimited marital deduction."5 9 When a spouse
47 Estate of Shackleford v. United States, No. CIV.S-96-1370LKKPAN, 1999 WL 744121, 84
A.F.T.R.2d (RJA) 5902, at *1, *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1999), affd sub nom. Shackleford v. United
States, 262 F.3d 1028 (9th Cit. 2001).
48 Id.
49 Id at

*5.

- 26 U.S.C. § 2010(a) (2012).
51 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013).
52 26 U.S.C. 5 2010(c)(3).
53 See, e.g., NONNA A. NoTo, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL40615, ESTATE AND GIFr TAx
REVENUES: PAST AND PROJECTED IN 2009, at 1-3 & tbl.1 (2009) (discussing year-by-year changes
in the estate tax); Darien B. Jacobson et al., The Estate Tax: Nineoy Years and Counting IRS STAT.
INCOME BULL., Summer 2007, at 118, 120-24.
54 Jacobson et al., supra note 53, at 122 fig.D.
55 I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-4 (Jan. 11, 2013) ("Estates of decedents who die during 2013
have a basic exclusion amount of $5,250,000, up from... $5,120,000... in 2012.").
56 See Glenn Ruffenach, Coming Soon: More Estate-Tax Batks, MARKET WATCH BLOG (Apr. 29,
2013, 12:09 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/encore/2013/04/29/coming-soon-more-estate
-tax-battles/ (discussing President Barak Obama's budget plan for the 2014 fiscal year, which calls
for a reduction in the estate tax exemption to $3.5 million in conjunction with the government's
greater need for revenue).
57 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3).
58 Id.§ 2056(a).
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inherits the property interest of her deceased spouse, no. estate tax liability is
assessed on that property to the extent it came from the deceased spouse. 60
In the icase of termination rights, because a surviving spouse receives a
statutory interest in her deceased spouse's termination right,61 the marital
deduction would apply to the extent of the surviving spouse's interest. 62 Three
possible scenarios ensue. First, where a deceased author is survived by a spouse
and no children or other statutory heirs, the surviving spouse would acquire the
entire interest in the termination right and thus the marital deduction would
apply to the entire value, hence no estate tax would be assessed on the value of
the termination right.63 Second, if a deceased author is survived by a spouse
and children or other statutory heirs, the surviving spouse would acquire a. onehalf interest. in the termination right and the marital deduction would apply to
fifty percent of the value, with an estate tax assessed on the other fifty percent. 64
Finally, where a deceased author is not survived by a spouse, the marital
65
deduction would not apply.
Once .a property interest is included in the gross estate, the heirs theni attain
a stepped-up basis 66 in that property interest, which lowers the income tax
liability upon the disposition of the property interest. 67
D. THE ADVANTAGE OF A STEPPED-UP BASIS

When property is disposed of, the gain or loss on that transaction is
determined by subtracting the "adjusted basis" 68 from the "amount realized." 69
The amount realized is typically the sale price or, in a transaction involving a
future payment or stream of payments, the present value of those payments. 70

59 BoRis I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION INCOME, ESTATE & GiFrs
129.6 (2013).
- 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
61 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
62 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
63 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(A); 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
64 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(A)-(C); 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
65 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
66 The stepped-up basis is "[t]he beneficiary's basis in property transitory by inheritance,
equating the fair market value of the property on the date of the decedent's death or on the
alternate valuation date." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 172 (9th ed. 2009).
67 26 U.S.C. § 1014.
68 The adjusted basis is the "[b]asis increased by capital improvement and decreased by
depreciation deductions." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 171 (9th ed. 2009).
69 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (a).
70 Id. § 1001(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (a) (2013).
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Often, a grantee's adjusted basis will differ from-the grantor's. In the case of
an author, the adjusted basis is- derived from the costs she expended in creating
the; copyrighted work.71 . However, an author is not allowed to incorporate the
value of her own time spent in the creation- of the copyrighted work, which
typically represents most, if not all, of the work's value.72 For example, in
Maniscalco v. Commissioner,the Sixth Circuit disallowed a charitable deduction for
a professional artist who sought to offset his "cost basis" in three of his
paintings that he had donated.7 3, The court, after finding that "[t]he value of
[the] paintings was attributable almost exclusively to the creative labor of the
taxpayer," 74 held that the artist's labor was not the type of expense that could
.,
give rise to,a cost basis. 75
In the case of an heir, the adjusted basis is equal to the "steppedup basis" in
the property acquired from the deceased author.76 The stepped-up basis is
calculated as "the fair market value of the property at the date of the decedent's
death." 77 This is equivalent to the calculation used to determine an asset's
present-value for estate tax purposes. 78 For example, in Levin v. United States, the
taxpayer inherited a promissory note that entitled her to a stream of future
payments, on which an estate tax equal to the fair market value of the note at
the decedent's death had been paid.79 The First Circuit held that "the estate tax
valuation" is the measure used to establish the heir's adjusted basis in the note
for income tax purposes.80
While the value at which an estate tax is assessed on a property interest gives
rise to the heir's stepped-up basis in that property interest, non-payment of the
estate tax, seemingly, does not preclude the stepped-up basis in the case of
termination rights.

See 26 U.S.C. § 1012(a) ("The basis of property shall be the cost of such property .. .
I.R.S. Pub. 551, Basis of Assets 4 (Rev. July 2011), availabk at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p551.pdf.
73 Maniscalco v. Comm'r, 632 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curium).
74 Id. at 7.
75 Id. at 7-8.
76 26 U.S.C. § 1014.
77 Id. § 1014(a)(1).
78 Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-1(a) (2013), aitbTreas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), andsupranotes 4546 and accompanying text.
79 Levin v. United States, 373 F.2d 434, 436-37 (1st Cir. 1967).
80 Id. at 439.
71
72
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E. BASIS IN TERMINATION RIGHTS

As mentioned previously, an author's cost basis in creating a copyrighted
work gives rise to the author's basis in the termination right. However, in most
cases the author is not permitted a cost basis with regard to her labor inputs.81
As with other types of reversionary interests, the basis in a termination right
carries over and establishes the basis in a copyright acquired through the
exercise of that termination right.8 2 For authors, whose initial cost basis in the
copyrighted work was minimal, this basis continues to be negligible. However,
for heirs, the stepped-up basis derived at the time of inheritance can be
83
substantial.
Heirs can deduct the stepped-up basis they acquire in a termination right
from the amount they ultimately receive upon selling the corresponding
copyright. This, in turn, will reduce the income tax assessed on that
transaction. s4 For example, in Williams v. Commissioner,the estate tax assessment
was based on the fair market value of a reversionary interest in a hotel the
taxpayer inherited on property the taxpayer's father had leased to a real estate
developer pursuant to a ground lease, which had not yet expired at the time of
the father's death.85 The taxpayer sought to deduct that amount from the
amount realized upon its disposition for income tax purposes.8 6 The Tax Court
concluded that the estate tax valuation as to the reversionary interest
incorporated the present value of the ownership rights beginning upon the
ground lease's expiration.8 7 The court then held that the taxpayer's stepped-up
basis established at the time the taxpayer acquired the reversionary interest via
inheritance was also the taxpayer's stepped-up basis in the hotel after the
88
ground lease expired.
81 I.R.S. Pub. 551, Basis of Assets 4 (Rev. July 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-

pdf/p551.pdf.
82 See Norton L. Steuben, The Income Tax Treatment of Interests Acquiredfrom A Ground Lessor, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 863, 878 (1996) (construing Comm'rv. Pearson, 188 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1951))
(deducing that although a lessor may not have a cost basis in a building constructed by a tenant
pursuant to a ground lease, the lessor's heir may acquire a stepped-up basis under 26 U.S.C.
§ 1014 in the reversionary interest in the building that matures upon the ground lease's
termination).
83 This is especially true where the author passes away near in time to when the termination
right window begins. See generally Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(7) & tbl.5 (2013) (establishing the

extent to which time from a future interest's maturity decreases its present value).
- 26 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a), 101 4(a) (2012).
85 Williams v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 1099, 1100 (1962).
86 Id. at 1102-03.
87 Id. at 1105.
88 Id.
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F. THE STEPPED-UP BASIS INDEPENDENT OF THE ESTATE TAX

Because the 1976 Act did not become effective until 1978, termination
rights derived from the earliest copyright dispositions in 1978 did not mature
until 2013.89 Accordingly, income taxes on re-assigned copyrights acquired via
the exercise of termination rights did not become due until 2014.90 Thus,
courts have not had the opportunity to adjudicate disputes regarding whether or
not the Service will permit heirs a stepped-up basis in dispositions where the
Service did not assess, and the author's estate did not pay, an estate tax. 91 The
pivotal issue is whether a stepped-up basis in a termination right is independent
from the assessment and payment of the estate tax. Related tax concepts,
equitable tax doctrine, and statutory interpretation provide some guidance as to
how taxpayers and the Service will approach the issue.
As a starting point, the marital deduction provides an example of the estate
tax operating independently from the stepped-up basis. Where a spouse
survives an author, the marital deduction precludes an estate tax assessment on
the interest in any termination rights the surviving spouse acquires. 92
Nonetheless, the surviving spouse still receives a stepped-up basis in her
interest in that termination right. 93 For example, in Patten v. United States, the
taxpayer inherited her deceased husband's interest in a parcel of real property. 94
The Fourth Circuit held that the taxpayer was entitled to both a marital
deduction when her husband died, eliminating estate tax liability, and a steppedup basis in the property when she subsequently sold it. 95 While the marital
deduction exemplifies the mechanics of how a taxpayer can establish a steppedup basis independent of the payment of an estate tax, the duty of consistency,
an equitable tax doctrine commonly used by the Service to prevent a taxpayer
from taking a position in a later period that is inconsistent with a position taken
by the taxpayer in an earlier period, 96 helps identify the legal principles

89 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 102-103, 90 Stat. 2541, 2592-93; 17 U.S.C.

203(a)(1), (3) (codifying that grants "executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978... [are]
subject to termination ... beginning... thirty-five years from the date of... the grant," which
corresponds to January 1, 2013).
90 26 U.S.C. § 6072(a).
91See Crawford & Gans, supra note 5, at 74 ("To date, the Service has not sought to enforce
any of the ... estate tax consequences of sticky copyrights.").
92 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
93 Id. § 1014(a)(1).
94 Patten v. United States, 116 F.3d 1029, 1031 (4th Cir. 1997).
95 Id.
96 Steve R. Johnson, The Taxpayer's Du y of Consistengy, 46 TAx L. REv. 537, 537 (1991).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2014

11

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 6

J. INTELL PROP. L

[Vol. 21:379

underlying this dichotomy when applied to cases where the recipient of an asset
is not a spouse.
The duty of consistency is particularly useful for the Service when :the
relevant statute of limitations has expired because it permits the Service to
circumvent-the statute in certain cases. 97 The statute of limitations by'which the
Service miist audit and assess a tax on an individual is three years from the later
of the date when the tax was due or filed.98 However, where the taxpayer dmits
greater than twenty-five percent of hei gross income, the statute of limitaiions
is extended to six years. 99 The statute of limitations applicable to the estate tax

expires ten years after the decedent's date of death. 1°°
Although not every jurisdiction permits the Service's use of the duty of
consistenc'y' to circumvent the statute of limitations in order to re-assess tax
liability, 101 the majority of courts have recognize the doctrine. 102 In jurisdictions
that do permit the duty of consistency defense, the courts commonly utilize the
Triune standard, which requires (1) the taxpayer represented or reported, an item
in one year, (2) the Service accepted or relied on that representation, and (3) the
taxpayer seeks to alter that representation in a later year after the statute of
limitations relating to the earlier year has closed. 10 3 For example, in Beltzer v.
United States, the taxpayer reported the fair market value of stock he inherited in
1959 as $59,713 for estate tax purposes. 1' 4 However, when the taxpayer later
sold that stock in 1966, he claimed that the actual fair market value, and
therefore the stepped-up basis, of the stock in 1959 was $118,019.10 After
concluding that (1) the taxpayer sought to change a prior representation for tax
purposes in a later yeaii (2) the Service had relied on that earlier representation,
and (3) the statute of limitations had run, the district court held that the
taxpayer was estopped from altering his earlier valuation of the stock for
income fax purposes. 1° 6 In contrast, in Hunt v. Commissioner, the taxpayers

97

Id.at 542.

26 U.S.C. § 6501 (a), (b)(1) (2012).
99 Id S 6501 (e)(i)(A).
1- Id. § 6324(a)(1).
101Johnson, supra note 96, at 539-41 ("mhe Second Circuit developed into the circuit most
hostile to [the duty of consistency doctrine]." (citing McCullough v. Comm'r, 153 F.2d 345, 347
(2d Cir. 1946); Salvage v. Comm'r, 76 F.2d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 1935), affd, 297 U.S. 106 (1936))).
102 Id at 539-40.
103 Id. at 542 (citing McMillan v. United States, Nos. 2769, 2770, 2771, 1964 WL 12375, at *2, *642 U.S.T.C. T 9720, 93838 (S.D. W. Va. June 4, 1964)).
104 Beltzer v. United States, Civil No. 72-0-394, 1973 WL 59, at *1 (D. Neb. June 8, 1973),
affid, 495 F.2d 211 (8th Cit. 1974).
105 Id.
106 Id
98
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acquired the decedent's estate, which required them to pay half the estate's
operating expenses. 07 Pursuant to a settlement agreement with the Service, the
taxpayers agreed to a set maximum of allowable deductions with respect to the
expenses associated with the estate. 108 Thereafter, the taxpayers sought to take
interest deductions on the estate's accounts payables that accrued after the
settlement in excess of the agreed maximum limit. 0 9 The Tax Court, after
finding that the settlement agreement was silent as to such interest deductions,
held that the duty of consistency was not applicable because the taxpayers
"made no affirmative representation with respect to claiming a deduction for
interest paid or accrued," and therefore the taxpayer was not estopped from
claiming the interest deductions." 0
In conjunction with the duty of consistency, direct statutory interpretation
also sheds some light on how a court might textually resolve a case in which the
Service has failed to assess an estate tax on the value of a termination right, but
on which the heir claims an income tax deduction for the amount.that should
have ben assessed.
Section 1014 provides that, where the executor has not elected an alternative
valuation through any of subsections (a)(3)-(4),, the heir's basis in- inherited
property is equal to its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death."'
The provision does not explicitly make the.entitlement to a stepped-up basis
contingent on the assessment or payment of an'estate tax related. to the
inherited property." 2 In fact, none of the relevant estate tax provisions are
explicitly conditions precedent to a stepped-up basis." 3 The regulations that
provide guidance on the interpretation and application of § 1014 state that "in
general, [the] basis for property acquired from a decedent [] is equal to the
value placed upon such property for purposes of the Federal estate tax. ' " 4
Here, Treasury Regulation § 1.1014-1 refers to the value placed upon the
property, rather than to the value upon which an estate tax was actually paid."5
The legislative history of § 1014 states that "[f]or the purposes of determining
what property is given a stepped-up basis, the test is generally whether the
property was included in the gross estate of the decedent."" 6 Here, the
107
108
109
110
11

Hunt v. Comm'r, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 791, 792-93 (1968).
Id. at 793--94.
Id at 794-96.
Id at 798.

26 U.S.C. § 1014(a)(1)-(4) (2012).

112 Id. § 1014.

113 Id. §§ 2031, 2033.

114 Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-1(a) (2013).
115 Id.

116 HR. RaP. No. 94-1380, at 36 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356, 3390.
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legislative history specifies the term included,rather than the more encompassing
term, includable.117 However, the history fails to further define the parameters of
the test's applicability." 8 Finally, in Treat v. Commissioner, the taxpayer inherited
real property, which for Massachusetts state estate tax purposes, she reported
only fifty percent of the value that she had reported for federal estate tax
purposes.11 9 She then sought to use the federal estate tax valuation as the
stepped-up basis for state income tax purposes when she sold the property120
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts determined that because the state tax
provision incorporated federal income tax provisions, the state tax provision
should be interpreted in the same way a federal court would interpret the
corresponding federal tax provisions. 121 Accordingly, the court held that the
taxpayer's stepped-up basis for state income tax purposes was limited to the
amount on which state estate taxes were actually paid.'2
Thus, while the majority of authorities suggest that a stepped-up basis is
independent from remittance of an estate tax, some do support what will most
likely be the Service's position, that the two are not independent.
G. A LIQUIDITY-BASED ESTATE TAX PROPOSAL

In Taxaion Without Liquidation: Rethinking 'Ability to Pqy," Professor Pareja
proposes an alternative approach to estate taxation and the establishment of a
stepped-up basis of all assets that are includable in the gross estate.123 Under
Professor Pareja's approach, all of a decedent's assets would be divided into two
categories: (1)liquid assets, and (2) illiquid assets. 24 Liquid assets would consist
of "cash or cash equivalents," such as publicly traded securities. 125 Illiquid
26
assets would consist of all other assets that are not in the former category.'
The estate tax and the stepped-up basis would apply as it currently does to the
liquid assets. 127 Conversely, the heir would have the choice between treating the

117 Id.
118 Id.

119 Treat v. Comm'r, 752 N.E.2d 784, 784-85 (Mass. App. Ct.2001).
120 Id.at 785.
121

Id.at 787.

122 Id.at 787-88.
123 Sergio Pareja, Taxaion Without Liquidation:Rethinking 'Abiy to Pay," 2008 Wis. L. REv. 841,

858.
124

Id.

125 Id.at 876.
126
127

Id.
Id.
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illiquid assets as they currently are treated, or deferring the tax until the assets
128
are sold by taking a zero basis in the assets upon the decedent's death.

III. ANALYSIS
A. UNSTOPPABLE ESTATE TAX AVOIDANCE

When an author who has previously disposed of a copyright dies, and her
statutory heirs become entitled to her termination right, an estate tax based on
the fair market value of the termination right at the date of the author's death is
technically due. 129 However, where the estate does not remit this tax,
termination rights will likely escape the resulting estate tax lien 130 once the
3
statute of limitations expires.' '
In the usual testamentary transfer of assets, if the estate tax is not timely
paid, a tax lien attaches to those assets until the executor of the estate pays the
estate tax. 132 In that event, the heirs would not receive the assets free and
clear.13 However, because § 203 creates the termination rights of heirs pursuant
to the death of an author but does not make the payment of an estate tax a
condition precedent to the entitlement of the termination rights, 134 the heirs
would instantly obtain the termination rights upon the author's death, free and
clear, with only the estate remaining liable for the estate tax. More precisely,
because termination rights are inalienable, the Service cannot seize them to pay
the estate tax.135 If the executor of the estate does not recognize that an estate
tax is owed on the termination rights, and the Service does not seek payment
within ten years of the author's death, the statute of limitations would preclude
the Service from assessing a tax liability on the inherited termination rights at
136
any later date.
The point at which an heir and the Service are likely to recognize the estate
tax liability is when, after exercising the termination right and recapturing the
underlying copyright, the heir re-assigns the copyright. For copyrights with a
seemingly perpetual value, such as the Superman copyright, re-assignment
128 Id.

129 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(a), (d)(2)(ii) (2013).
130 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2012).
131Id. § 6324(a)(1).
132

Id.

§ 6324(a)(2).
13 17 U.S.C.§ 203.
135 But see 26 U.S.C. § 6334(a), (c)(precluding levy-exempt status of any assets not listed, and
omitting termination rights). Thus, this result directly conflicts with the Code.
136 Id. § 6324(a)(1).
133 Id.
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transactions could result in exceptionally high returns.137 After realizing such a
large sum in a single tax year, the heir will most likely attempt to reduce her
income tax. liability. Because an income tax is assessed only on the net income
from the copyright re-assignment transaction, the taxpayer will remit an income
tax on the amount realized from the transaction after reducing it by the adjusted
basis in the copyright. 138 The relevant adjusted basis is the stepped-up basis of
the transaction right under § 1014. The question in this situation is whether the
heir should be allowed to reduce her income tax liability by an amount equal to
her stepped-up basis in a termination right on which no estate tax was paid.
If the heir seeks to utilize the stepped-up basis to reduce her income tax
liability within ten years of the author's death, the statute of limitations will
remain open and the Service may revise its tax assessment of the estate, 39 in
which the termination right was included. 14° In this scenario, while theService
would not be able to obtain a tax lien that would attach to the termination right
or underlying copyright, the Service could obtain a lien based on the value of
4
the termination right that would attach to other assets in the author's estate.' '
Because termination rights only mature thirty-five years after the author's
initial disposition of a copyright, 142 a situation in which the author passes away
within twenty-five years after this disposition would not be uncommon.
Accordingly, where the statute of limitations has expired after the ten-year
mark, the Service may seek to circumvent the statute in order to maintain the
integrity of the relationship between the estate tax, the stepped-up basis, and
the income tax. In order to reassess the estate tax attributable to the value of a
termination right when the statute of limitations has expired, the Service will
likely make an equitable argument relying on the duty of consistency.
Since authors and heirs will recapture and reassign copyrights under § 203
for the first time in 2013, the Service has not yet pursued litigation relating to
2013 income tax returns that incorporate the proceeds from such a transaction.
However, based on the particular facts surrounding termination rights, the
Service's duty of consistency argument will most likely fail and the courts will
not force the relevant estates to remit estate tax payments once the statute of

137See, e.g., Larson v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., No. 2:04-cv-08776-ODW (RZx), 2013 WL
1688199, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2013) (order granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment re: Superboy and Superman ads); ECF No. 222 (citing the "vast spectrum of Superman
and Superboy works").
138 26 U.S.C. § 1001.
139 Id.

140 Id. §6665.

141Id. § 6324(a)(1).
142 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3); see also supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
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limitations has expired. Just as the taxpayers in Hunt remained silent on the
taxable value of interest deductions in their estate tax settlement agreement with
the, Service, so too have executors of estates that include termination rights
remained silent with respect to claims of the taxable value of those termination
rights. Unlike the taxpayer in Beltzer, who made an affirmative representation of
the value of his stock for estate tax purposes, and then later asserted a higher
value with respect to the stepped-up basis in the stock for income tax purposes
when he sold it, executors have passively presumed the non-existence of any
estate tax liability stemming from termination rights. Because executors have
passively failed to acknowledge a tax liability in relation to the inheritance of
termination rights, the heirs then may seek to establish a value of-the steppedup basis. This is distinguishable from a situation in which the heirs actively
assert one (lower) value at the time the estate tax is assessed and then assert
another (higher) value for the purpose of reducing income tax liability upon
disposition. Accordingly, a duty of consistency argument is precluded because
there,,would be no inconsistency. Thus, the reality of termination right
inheritance, where executors have failed to remit an estate tax, more closely
resembles the facts of Hunt. If Hunt governs, the courts will not permit the
Service to reassess an estate tax liability based on the duty of consistency after
the statute of limitations closes.
Under the peculiar facts that surround termination rights, the Service and
the Code will often fail to ensure that the tax consequences associated with the
reassignment of copyrights under 5 203 reflect economic realities. That is,
some amount of taxable revenue relating to the claimed stepped-up bases will
not have been paid. Prospectively, the Service will have only one method of
recourse for remedying this tax avoidance: actively assessing an estate tax on
termination rights under 5 201.
B. TAX POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: THE FAIRNESS VS. EFFICIENCY DEBATE

The three traditional tax policy considerations are equity, simplicity, and
neutrality. 143 This Note will also consider a fourth factor that relates to tax
policy, which is contextually relevant to termination rights: liquidity.
Tax equity encompasses three primary concepts: horizontal equity, vertical
equity, and relatedly, ability to pay. 44 Horizontal equity represents the notion
143 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxaion, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2006); see airo JOSEPH
A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAx PoLicY 5 (5th ed. 1987) (discussing policy considerations in federal
tax reform).
144Pareja, supra note 123, at 858; see also PECHMAN, supra note 143 (dividing equity into
"vertical" and "horizontal" equity).
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that taxpayers who are similarly situated should be taxed similarly.145 For
example, if one estate includes a one million dollar stock portfolio, and another
estate includes property worth one million dollars, the estate tax liability should
be the same in each instance. Vertical equity represents the belief that taxpayers
should be taxed in proportion to their relative abilities to pay.' 46 For example,
the tax system reasons that a taxpayer with a $1 million salary is able to part
with a greater percentage of her salary than a taxpayer with a $10,000 salary.
This reasoning is used to justify the progressivity of tax rates. 147 Incidentally,
the ability to pay theory does not consider issues relating to the liquidity of
48
various types of assets.
The concept of simplicity refers to both the taxpayer's ability, to
comprehendand comply with the relevant tax provisions, and the Service's
ability to -assess, administer, and enforce the tax code. 149 Simplicity is favored
because it lowers the costs of administering and complying with the tax code. 50
Tax neutrality embodies the goal of avoiding distortion in the economic
behavior of taxpayers.' 5' For example, if artists were exempt from paying
income taxes, this rule would distort economic behavior, as some taxpayers
who would not have otherwise pursued the profession of art might forego
another profession simply for the tax benefit. This result would lead to a
general distortion in the labor market and produce economic inefficiency.
However, in some cases policymakers purposefully use the tax code to generate
preferences for certain individuals, industries, or activities in order to achieve an
explicit policy goal. 15 2 For example, if the creation of intellectual property
encompassed by copyright law was viewed as exceptionally beneficial to the
economy as a whole, Congress might create a tax preference for authors
permitting them to deduct the costs of their labor expended in the creation
process, while such deductions for other professionals such as lawyers might
continue to be disallowed.

145 MjCHAEL A. LIVINGSTON & DAVID S. GAMAGE, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING, AND POLIcY 8
(2d ed. 2010).
146Pareja, supra note 123, at 858.
147 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON 681, 682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953).

148 Pareja, supra note 123.
149 See Edward Yorio, Equity, Effidengy, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395,
426-27 (1987) ("Critics of tax expenditures argue that.., the complexity of the tax system []
generates unproductive transaction costs in plurality and compliance by taxpayers and in
administration and enforcement by government.").
150 Id at 436-37.
151 Pareja, supra note 123, at 864.
152 Id. at 842.
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Liquidity is defined as the ease with which a taxpayer can convert an asset
into cash or its equivalent. 15 3 Cash is, by definition, the most liquid asset.
Assets such as publicly traded stocks and bonds, for which national and
international market exchanges with many buyers and sellers exist, are also very
liquid assets. 5 4 In contrast, assets such as houses or boats, which usually
require high transaction costs in order to identify a willing buyer, are considered
comparably less liquid assets. Finally, something that cannot be sold, but has
value, would represent an absolutely illiquid asset. Termination rights fall
squarely within this last category, as they are in many instances valuable future
property interests, but pursuant to 5 203 cannot be readily sold and are
therefore illiquid assets. While the U.S. tax system usually does not distinguish
between liquid and illiquid assets, 55 from a practical standpoint taxing an
illiqui& asset can exact an excessive burden on a taxpayer who must expend
resources converting her property into cash with which to pay the tax. 5 6
These policy considerations are particularly crucial if, and when, the Service
begin s to assess an estate tax on the inheritance of termination rights.
C. THE NORMAL TAX RULES DO NOT WORK FOR TERMINATION RIGHTS

Under the current estate tax provisions, the value of a termination right on
the date of an author's death, to the extent that any family members other than
the author's spouse inherit it, is includable in the gross estate. 5 7 However,
because termination rights, or any interests therein, cannot be assigned, an
author's heirs have no way to derive value from the termination right in order
to pay the estate tax liability. If the estate includes other personal or real
property, a disproportionate amount of those assets will then have to be sold in
order to pay the estate tax on the value of the termination right. If the estate
does not include other assets of substantial value, to the extent that the value of
the termination right exceeds the exclusion amount, the estate may literally be
unable to pay the tax.
The estate tax exclusion incorporates a progressivity similar to that of the
income tax with the notion that estates valued above the exclusion amount have

153 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1014 (9th ed. 2009).

154 Id.
155 But see Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The legislative history
reveals that [§ 1031] was designed to avoid the imposition of a tax on those who do not 'cash in'
on their investments.").
156 JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 11 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 16th ed.

2012).
15726 U.S.C. 5 2001 (a), 2056(a) (2012).
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a greater ability to pay an estate tax.158 However, this justification does not hold
true for termination rights, the value of which constitute wealth in an
accounting. sense, but not as an economic reality at the date of the author's
death. Thus, the more valuable a termination right, as determined by the value
of the author's underlying copyright, the more disadvantaged the heirs are in an
absolute sense for purposes of the estate tax because they must sell more assets
to pay the tax. Therefore, the notion of vertical equity-that those in a higher
tax bracket pay more taxes because they have a greater ability to pay--does not
hold true for termination rights.
The same conclusion follows by comparing the tax consequences associated
with two equally valued estates, in which one includes a termination right and
the other does not. Again, in an accounting sense the tax system would deem
these estates as similarly situated. However, the tax consequences are''harsher
for the estate with the termination right because the other can choose among its
assets which ones it should sell to cover the estate tax. Yet, § 203 restricts an
estate's disposition of a termination right and forces it to deplete other assets to
cover the estate tax. Alternatively, if the author died within the termination
window, the executor could be forced to quickly terminate the original transfer
and re-assign the copyright of a disadvantageous price. The after-tax result in
these situations is not consistent with horizontal equity because the estate
without a termination right has more freedom to choose which assets it will use
to pay the estate tax.
The fact that termination rights cannot be used in any way to pay an estate
tax also inhibits the administrability of the tax system. The difficulty of valuing
an asset is usually not dispositive of whether it should be taxed or not, since the
Service goes to great lengths to establish methods of valuing various assets for
tax purposes. Thus, even though predicting the value of an underlying
copyright upon the maturation of a termination right would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, the Service still would require such a valuation. 5 9 A
very problematic issue of administrability arises when the vast majority of the
value in a gross estate is comprised of one or more termination rights. If the
remaining assets cannot cover the estate tax liability and the Service cannot
attach a tax lien to the termination rights, the heirs would attain the termination
rights without the estate paying a corresponding tax. This would undermine the
goal of horizontal equity, since estates with termination rights would, in effect,

158 Krisanne M. Schlahter, Repeal of the FederalEstate and Benefit Tax: Will It Happen and How Will
It Affect OurProgressive Tax System?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 781, 806-10 (2000).
159 Conm'r v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413 (1931) ("Some valuation-speculative or otherwise-

[is] necessary in order to close the estate.").
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face lower tax consequences than those estates that contained other types of
similarly valued assets.
If the Service were to begin enforcement of the estate tax on termination
rights, authors who comprehend the burden that the inclusion of termination
rights in their gross estate could place on their heirs may react either by not
disposing of their copyright in the first place, or in the extreme case, by pursing
another profession where the work-product is not taxed in a situation where it
160
affords no ability to pay an after death tax.
Alternatively, the adverse tax consequences that would result from the
inheritance of termination right could encourage authors and their heirs to enter
into settlement agreements with the recipients of the original copyrights. Under
such. an agreement the author or her heirs would promise not to exercise their
termination right in return for monetary consideration.161 In Larson, the court
characterized such agreements as a "revocation and re-grant" and held that they
were not agreements contrary to 5 304 because they effectively fulfilled
Congress's policy goal; such an agreement is not an unremunerated transfer of
the author or the heir's reversionary interest. 162 However, this is analogous to
the historical path of inalienable copyright renewal rights created by the
Copyright Act of 1909, which were ultimately rendered ineffective when the
Court in FredFisherMusic Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons upheld the author's right to
prematurely dispose of the aforementioned reversionary interest. 163 Similarly,
the present taxation of termination rights, in conjunction with the willingness of
some modern courts to hold settlement agreements binding upon the parties,
may incentivize authors to prematurely dispose of their termination rights in
order to avoid the burden the estate tax would impose on their heirs.
Such a result would mean that the estate taxation of termination rights
would not be neutral. If these behavioral distortions are widespread, they
would undermine the 1976 Act, impede the growth of intellectual property, and
potentially distort the macroeconomy.
In light of these shortcomings, and the potential unfairness to heirs of
termination rights in a tax scheme that imposes an estate tax on termination

Crawford & Gans, supra note 5, at 74.
Larson, 2013 WL 1688199, at *1.
162 Id., at *2-3 (citing Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (9th Cir. 2005); Milne ex
rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cit. 2005)).
163 See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 20, at 804-05 (citing Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S.
153, 185 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); Fred FisherMusic Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643,
655-56 (1943), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012))).
160

161
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rights, the time is ripe for an alternative approach that maintains the integrity of
the tax system and better serves tax policy considerations.
D. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: NO ESTATE TAX, NO STEPPED-UP BASIS

In Taxaion Witbout Liquidation: Rethinking 'Abiliy to Pay," Professor Pareja
focuses primarily on liquidity. 164 That is, the actual ability of the estate to pay an
assessed tax. 165 With liquid assets, this ability comes easily: The estate simply
writes a check or sells off some portion of its liquid assets. With assets that are
not as liquid, however, the estate would have to expend resources locating a
buyer at a reasonable price. Presumably, an estate tax system that forces an
estate to prematurely dispose of its assets would distort capital markets and
exact hardship on the heirs, who might achieve a greater return on those assets
by waiting until the value of the assets appreciates from a potential upswipg in
the market. Accordingly, the Service would also derive greater revenvie if it
instead taxes assets when an heir disposes of them at a higher price, particularly
if the basis in those assets is lower than the fair market value thereof on the date
of the decedent's death.
Drawing a line between liquid and illiquid assets for estate tax purposes
might lead to an inevitable gray area somewhere in the middle. However, this
distinction is not troublesome in the case of termination rights.. Termination
rights are not only less liquid relative to other types of assets, they are also
illiquid in an absolute sense because of their inalienability. Thus, termination
rights fall on the very end of the illiquid side of the liquidity spectrum.
An approach similar to Professor Pareja's-that could be applied to
termination rights-is to impose no estate tax upon the author's death and
provide the heirs with a carryover basis from the deceased author. Under this
approach, when the heirs ultimately exercise the termination right, recapture the
underlying copyright, and reassign the copyright, the heirs would have an
income tax liability on the difference between the price at which they reassign
the copyright and the carryover basis.
In contrast to Professor Pareja's approach, which provides for a zero basis
where the heir makes a deferral election for an illiquid asset, 166 a carryover basis
is more efficient in the case of termination rights. A carryover basis is the same
approach the Code uses for property acquired by gifts. 167 Professor Pareja
points out that such an approach in the realm of inheritance can be problematic
164 Id. at 843.
165 Id. at 843-44.
166 Id. at 890-91.
167 26 U.S.C. § 1015 (2012).
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for property that has remained in a family for numerous generations. 168 In such
a situation, the heir may not be able to identify the cost at which the property
was initially acquired. 69 However, this problem is minor or nonexistent in the
context of termination rights. Because a termination right expires forty years
after the initial copyright disposition, the right could only be inherited within
this' ame window. Accordingly, the issue of obtaining financial records in the
case of termination rights is less of a concern, since it is not likely that more
than two generations would be involved in the inheritance. This is in contrast
with the situation contemplated by Professor Pareja where the necessary
records relate to a transaction that could have taken place over one hundred
years prior.
As previously discussed, an author's cost basis in a copyright, and
consequently in the termination right, is often negligible because the'value of an
author's time and efforts are not included. 7 0 However, in those cases in which
the cost basis is substantial, a zero basis in the property leads to an unfairly
greate ultimate tax liability upon the reassignment of the copyright. On the
margii, such a rule could have the effect of discouraging authors from pursuing
creative careers or cause them to engage in settlement agreements to
circumvent the estate tax.
This proposed alternative approach does not provide an election to permit
an estate to treat termination rights as they are treated currently. The steppedup basis is a significant tax preference and can incentivize families to wait to
transfer property until the death of the owner, since the stepped-up basis
usually is greater than the carryover basis. Accordingly, a family would be able
to escape taxation on the difference between what would be the carryover basis
and the stepped-up basis. If the estate has liquid assets, Professor Pareja would
allow families to take advantage of the stepped-up basis if the estate can afford
to feasibly pay the estate tax on the value of the gross estate. The problem with
this approach is that if the estate contains a termination right, it raises the
previously discussed issue of tax avoidance. If the Service fails to assess an
estate tax when an author dies and the statute of limitations has expired, heirs
could attain a stepped-up basis without paying a corresponding estate tax by
retroactively making such an election. Additionally, with an approach that only
allowed the election going forward, problems relating to valuation and the
administration of an estate tax on termination rights would remain.

168 Pareja,
169 Id.
170

supra note 123, at 890.

See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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E. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

The policy concerns of liquidity, equity, simplicity, and neutrality support the
implementation of an alternative tax approach to termination rights that
consists of no estate tax and a carryover basis.
Because no estate tax would be assessed under the alternative approach, no
liquidity problem would arise for an author's estate that includes unmatured
termination rights-at least not with respect to the termination rights. When a
termination right does mature, the heirs may exercise the right, and ultimately
sell the recaptured copyright; again, no illiquidity problem would arise in
connection with the income taxation of this transaction. While the heirs might
be compensated in some form other than cash, such as a promissory note, the
tax code affords no leniency in this situation pursuant to the theory of
constructive receipt and the tax benefit doctrine.' 7' That is, because the
taxpayer could exchange the promissory note for cash, albeit at some discount,
the transaction constitutes a tax recognition event. With termination rights, the
problem is that because such rights are inalienable, they cannot be sold at any
price, which makes them absolutely illiquid. Once the copyright is sold for a
promissory note, even though this form of compensation is relatively less liquid
than cash, it is not in the same category of illiquidity as termination rights.
With respect to horizontal equity, the differing rate structures of the estate
tax and income tax preclude perfect equality between two heirs who inherit
assets of equal value if one of those assets is a termination right. When an asset
is taxed as part of an estate, the key advantage is that the estate can utilize the
estate tax exclusion amount. Conversely, the advantage of deferring taxation
until the heir ultimately sells the asset is that the heir will benefit from the time
value of money concept. In other words, even though the gross income from
the disposition of the asset will be taxed at the heir's marginal rate in the year in
which the heir sells it, the heir could theoretically set aside a lesser amount in an
earlier year and invest it in anticipation of the tax. Under the proposed
approach, the reassignment of a copyright that was obtained via a termination
right would be taxed as ordinary income. 7 2 Because the rates and exclusion
amounts change over time, it would be highly difficult to compare the equities
between the two aforementioned heirs across all the relevant years and at each
tax rate. As a general rule, where the termination right would have been
included in a gross estate that was less than the exclusion amount, the heir to
the other asset is better off. At a certain valuation of the gross estate above the

171 BANKMAN ET AL., supranote 156, at 256-57.
172 26 U.S.C. § 1221 (a)(3)(C) (2012).
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exclusion amount, the heir to the termination right, which is not included in the
gross estate, ultimately sees less of the value of his or her asset depleted from
th6 payment of taxes. Therefore, the consideration of horizontal equity is not
necessarily satisfied in any given situation, but under the proposed approach, no
systematic bias favoring heirs of termination rights or other assets would exist.
The goal of progressivity embodied by vertical equity and the ability to pay is
necdsarily satisfied under the proposed approach with respect to termination
rights: Because no estate tax would be assessed, the problems relating to
illiquidity and the fairness of the exclusion amount would not arise. The only
time that the termination right heirs would owe a tax liability is when they
ultimately reassign the underlying copyright. As this would be an" income tax
liability, the same rate progressivity that applies to other forms of in'come also
would apply to recaptured copyrights. Therefore, the proposed approach to the
taxation of termination rights would achieve vertical equity to the same extent
that, the income tax system ordinarily does.
Un~ler the proposed approach, the heirs would not be required at the time
of e author's death to calculate the present value of the right to recapture the
underling copyright at some future date that is necessary for the estate tax.
Because-such computation incorporates long-run economic forecasting, varying
levels of risk, and discounting in relation to certain interest rates, this valuation
is difficult, costly, and inherently speculative. When an item is taxed as income
the only calculation required is the subtraction of the basis from the sale price.
Because these values are objective and easily identifiable, termination right heirs
could comply with the tax code at a much lower cost and with greater certainty
under the proposed approach.
Similarly, under the proposed approach, the Service would not have to
double-check the aforementioned forecasting and discounting calculations for
the estate tax valuation of termination rights. Instead, it would only need to
inspect documents of sale relating to the recaptured copyright upon the
remittance of the corresponding income tax. Therefore, the Service could more
easily and cheaply administer the taxation of termination rights under the
proposed approach.
Because recaptured copyrights would be taxed the same as other forms of
income under the proposed approach, it would be tax neutral by comparison.
However, as previously discussed, differing rate structures of the estate and
income -taxes cause horizontal inequity and thus have the potential to distort
taxpayer behavior. Yet, because the bias is not systematic, authors would not
be prospectively incentivized to or deterred from pursuing creative careers or
prematurely settling their termination rights because of tax considerations.
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Therefore, in the aggregate, the proposed approach would offer a tax neutral
alternative to the current taxation of termination rights.
One policy argument could be made against the proposed alternative
because the structure of the approach is such that it defers some amount of
taxation on the right of heirs to recapture and reassign a copyright. The
amount deferred will equal the difference between the fair market value of the
termination right at the time of the author's death and the author's cost basis.
In present value terms, this means that the Treasury would be disadvantaged
because if it had the tax revenue in the earlier period it theoretically could have
invested it and, under the time value of money concept, by the time the heir
reassigns the recaptured copyright, the Treasury then could have derived a
greater sum., This reasoning seems to undermine the logic behind the proposed
alternative approach, but the proposed alternative is revived by the fact that the
Service has failed to assess the estate tax on termination rights under the current
approach.17 3 At any rate, it is not clear that the investment interest that the
Treasury could accrue under the current approach is enough to offset its
enforcement costs. Again, the evidence of non-enforcement seems to suggest
this conclusion.
The policy goals of vertical equity, ease of compliance and administration,
and taxing only taxpayers who have the present ability to pay, would be
categorically better served by the proposed approach to the taxation of
termination rights. To be sure, horizontal equity and tax neutrality would not
necessarily be achieved in every instance under the proposed approach.
However, these goals would not suffer from a systematic bias as they do under
the present approach. Although the Treasury might obtain less revenue in the
long-run in present value terms under the proposed approach, this concern is
rendered moot by the Service's failure to enforce the estate tax under the
current approach. Accordingly, the major policy goals of the tax system would
be better served by the Government's adoption of the alternative approach to
the taxation of termination rights.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The primary problem with the current approach to the taxation of
termination rights is that termination rights are inalienable, and thus an author's
estate may not be able to pay a tax on the termination rights unless it sells off
other assets. This financial conundrum for heirs, on the margin, could deter
173 See Crawford & Gans, suApra note 5, at 74 ("To date, the Service has not sought to enforce
any ... tax consequences of [termination rights].").
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potential authors from a creative career or lead them to seek ways to subvert
the Copyright Act of 1976, and in many cases is unfair. In reality, because the
Service has failed to enforce this estate tax and the inalienability of termination
rights precludes the attachment of a tax lien, when the relevant statute of
limitation expires, heirs can effectively avoid the estate tax liability. This result
is manifestly unjust with respect to other similarly situated taxpayers.
By adopting the proposed alternative approach to the taxation of
termination rights whereby no estate tax is assessed, heirs receive a carryover
basis from the author, and subsequently pay an income tax on the sale price of
the recaptured copyright, less the carryover basis. Under the proposed
approach, estates would not be taxed when they are absolutely illiquid, heirs
would be able to more easily comply with the tax code, and the Serice could
effectively enforce it. Moreover, when heirs seek to exercise their termination
rights and reassign the underlying copyrights for the first time in 2013, they
would not be able to claim a § 1014 basis for which no corresponding estate tax
was ever paid.
Many factors go into one's selection of a profession. A major consideration
is the legacy one will leave for his or her heirs. This legacy includes the fruits of
one's labor that comprises the value of what one passes on to future
generations, and the tax code should not distort these considerations. The
proposed alternative should be adopted because it is the simplest way to
preserve non-tax incentives and prevent tax avoidance in the termination right
context.
Jerome Siegel created Superman before the implementation of the 1976 Act
that created termination rights for authors and their heirs. Thus, he did not
have to worry at the time about the effect of this Act on his heirs. But now,
post-1976, creators of copyrighted intellectual property will have to worry about
the effect of the Act on theirs. One of these individuals could be the author of
the next Superman, whose creative genius and resulting intellectual property may
cause tax problems for his or her heirs. The proposed alternative approach to
taxing termination rights, if adopted, would give the creative genius some peace
of mind.
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